Decolonization, 70 years after the cannonade of Candi

The cannonade of Candi-Karanganyar

Nederlandse samenvatting volgt hieronder.

On 19 October 2017, it was 70 years ago that the "Cannonade of Candi-Karanganyar" took place. The first time I read about it was when I found the website of Ravie Ananda in a search for "Keboemen" in September 2015.

On this website Ravie Ananda describes the history of the Mexolie-factory where  both our fathers had worked in the 1930's and the 1970's.  He also writes about the history of the war in Keboemen and about the cannonade on Candi-Karanganyar, that took place on October 19, 1947.

The website of Ravie Ananda, in which he describes the cannonade on 19 October 1947.

It appeared that the dutch journalist Max van der Werff (NCRV-TV) and the indonesian historian Ady Setyawan had visited Ravie Ananda already in 2013 and had reported about this cannonade, in which 786 people were killed, on the dutch television. I could not find any additional information about this incident. Also, in the thesis of Rémy Limpach, which I obtained in January 2016, the cannonade on Karanganyar was not mentioned (Post #29- okt. 2016). Helped by Dr. Bart Luttikhuis (KITLV), I started to retrieve information about the cannonade from the Dutch National Archive: it appeared that most details of Ravie Ananda's description were confirmed by dutch battle reports (Post #30, 17 December 2016 and Post #31, 2017).

After making a call in the veteran magazine "Checkpoint", I was contacted by Map de Lange, a veteran of the second "Police Action" of 1948. Together with Rémy Limpach and Azarja Harmanny, we watched at the NIMH the documentary "Tabee Toean"(1995) by Thom Verheul (see Post #31, 11 May 2017). The movie shows four dutch veterans visiting their locations of combat actions on Java. One of them, the artillerist Henry Pezy (3-6RVA), tells how they fired from a road at Gombong about 3000 granades with 12 cannons. "I am still curious about what has become of the people in Karanganyar", he remarks when visiting the market of Candi.

Visit to the veteran Map de Lange, who has an impressive documentation about the Dutch colonial war (May 1, 2017).

After studying the battle reports and other documents obtained from the National Archive, Map de Lange makes the observation that the Army Commander Spoor only became aware of the cannonade 10 days later. The question who ordered the bombardment will perhaps be answered by historians involved in the newly started research project on the decolonization war. However, as argued below, this study has a more important purpose!

"Vergangenheitsbewältigung" (public debate on a problematic period)

In his article ("Geschiedenis Magazine", nr. 4, June 2017), Rémy Limpach  is wondering how countries like France, England and Germany have coped with their colonial past. His examples include the French in Algeria (-1962) and the English in Kenya (Mau-mau, 1952-1960). The Germans seem to have successfully overcome the Holocaust and helped by the Allied Occupation Forces, they received the image of "Weltmeister der Vergangenheitsbewältigung". But unfortunately, their dealing with the 1904-genocide committed in Namibia is still under way.

Benjamin Ferencz: "If people are made into beasts" and "Governements must stand trial to explain their behavior for a judge". During his visit (19 May 2017) to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague.

  

But what about the Dutch in the period 1945-1950? Almost everything is known and documented. But the lost war has so far been hushed-up efficiently. The crimes described are shocking. But can they surprise us? According to Benjamin Ferencz, Neurenberg's former prosecutor, the war makes murderers of decent people. In an interview he talks about the brutes of the so-called "Einzatsgruppen" who killed about one million people behind the front in Eastern Europe:

Although each of those men have hundreds of deaths on their conscience, Ferencz does not believe that they were bad by nature. "It's a big mistake to think so. I wondered how a man like Otto Ohlendorf (Commander of one of the Einzatsgruppen), highly educated and father of five children, could have been able to do that. My conclusion is that war makes killers of otherwise decent people. These men were patriots who believed they served the interests of their country. "

Limpach notes that the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic in the period 1945-1950 were in fact a farce. How was that possible? Did the government officials in the Netherlands and in the colony not have the least incentive to reach a political solution? Did these government officials just go for war?

The dutch journalist John Jansen van Galen does not agree with the above: according to him the dutch governement pursued a Union between Indonesia and the Netherlands on a voluntary and equal basis and never wanted to conserve its colony...... It seems to me that the historians should be able to describe the facts here. If Limpach's description is right the debt claim lies not only in the Dutch armed forces but also in its leadership, the public administrations, both in the colony and in the Hague.

Decolonization, violence and war in Indonesia, 1945-1950

On September 14, 2017 the kick-off for the program "Decolonization, violence and war in Indonesia" took place in Amsterdam. The three institutes, KITLV, NIOD and NIMH, will receive a financial support of 4 million euros for this research.

From the "stream" of the kick-off meeting on 14 September 2017: A sometimes uncomfortable conversation between Wouter Veraart, Rémy Limpach, Esther Captain and Marjolein van Pagee.

Critical questions were asked by Annelot Hoek and especially by Marjolein van Pagee (1). It seemed as if Marjolein van Pagee missed something in the framing of the research proposals. Was it the involvement or identification with the opponent, one of the most uncomfortable things to achieve? She pointed out that we are going to Indonesia, but we are not listening to the Indonesians. "Talk with them", she exclaimed

Azarja Harmanny went to Kebumen (August 2017) to talk with Ravie Ananda. Here they are standing in front of the monument at Candi. 

There is something behind the anger of Marjolein van Pagee. Is it the same anger as felt, for instance, by Afro-Suriname people in the Netherlands, when the government expressed her sincere regret about slavery and slave trade in the past? Such recognition is worthless if not supported by the white community. 

I think that Marjolein van Pagee tries to make us aware that this study about decolonization, violence and war in Indonesia should not only be about its historical facts. It should also tell the Dutch community about the Indonesian people who had suffered, although standing on the winning side. We know so much about the life of Dutch people in the colony, almost on a daily basis like in the case of my parents (e.g. see french Blog Posthume). But what do we know about the (grand)parents of, for instance, Ravie Ananda, who suffered not only the war, but had been living in an "apartheid" society, as emphasized by Prof. Wouter Veraart in the panel discussion during the kick-off meeting of September 14?

This study of the 1945-1950-war in Indonesia should give us additional facts but also help us to identify with the Indonesians. Only when a larger part of the Dutch community recognizes and accepts the historical injustices committed there, the governement will be able to perform a "policy of regret" (2). Only then will this investigation of the decolonization have proven its necessity and value.

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(1) Marjolein van Pagee, is freelance researcher and journalist. She founded Histori Bersama in September 2016. The activity of the foundation is to translate recent publications from Dutch and Indonesian media that refer to the colonial past and the Indonesian decolonization war (1945-1949).

(2) Ewout Tenhagen; scriptie onder begeleiding van dr. Remco Raben,  Universiteit Utrecht; "Duiding van een donker verleden", 10 juli 2017:

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Nederlandse samenvatting

In dit blog, geschreven 70 jaar na de "Cannonade op Candi", beschrijf ik hoe dit onderwerp is ontstaan. Daarna ga ik in op een artikel van Rémy Limpach, waarin hij voor diverse landen nagaat hoe zij hun dekolonisatie verwerkt hebben. Ik verwijs daarbij naar het bezoek (in mei 2017) van oud-Neurenberg-aanklager Benjamin Ferencz aan het Internationaal Strafhof (ICC) in Den Haag, Hij pleit ervoor dat uiteindelijk ook een regering voor begane wandaden terecht moet staan.

Tijdens de kick-off op 14 september jl. van het door de regering gesubsidieerde onderzoek naar de dekolonisatieoorlog 1945-1950, werd er ongemakkelijke kritiek geuit door o.a. Marjolein van Pagee. Bij haar en anderen is een boosheid te bespeuren die me doet denken aan de Zwarte-Piet discussie. Net zoals de spijtbetuiging van onze regering voor de slavernij geen waarde heeft als zij niet ook breed gedragen wordt door de blanke gemeenschap, zo ook is een spijtbetuiging voor het structurele geweld toegepast in Nederlands-Indië onvoldoende als de Nederlandse gemeenschap dit onrecht niet erkent. Pas als wij ons in Nederland beter kunnen vereenzelvigen met het lot van de Indonesiërs gedurende de periode 1945-1950, zal het dekolonisatie-onderzoek haar noodzaak en waarde bewezen hebben.

The cannonade of Candi (Indonesia) on October 19th, 1947

About 2 years ago, Max van der Werff (NCRV-TV) and Ady Setyawan visited Ravie Ananda in Kebumen. They interviewed him about a story on his website "Wahyu Pancasila", called "Commemorating the Cannonade of Candi". Here he reports about the Dutch artillery bombarding the market in Candi-Karanganyar causing 786 casualties. 

Left: Drs. Mathieu Willemsen (conservator of the Nederlands Militair Museum) in front of a 25-pounder cannon (with a range of 12.25 km and a firing speed of 7 shots per min) as used by the 3-6 Regiment Field Artillery. Right: Photograph from the book "Success in a lost war" by Ben Bouman (see ref. 1).

I am interested in this history, because Ravie Ananda is a current resident of Kebumen, who gives the victims of the colonial war, in the words of Martin Witteveen (nrc-article in my previous blog), "a face and a voice". In addition, the story belongs to the history of Keboemen, the first place in the Dutch colony where my parents arrived in 1933 and from where my mother started to describe her experiences in the colonial society in weekly letters to her parents in Switzerland (see "Java 1933: un blog posthume" posted by Catherine Marchand). Ravie Ananda reacted to my post "Kebumen:past and present", on September 20, 2015. Since then we regularly corresponded with each other.

Things beyond description have happened in Candi and in Keboemen, also on the grounds of the Dutch Mexolie factory. Why do I describe them? Because I want to know what is in all those documents, photographs and letters left behind by my parents and because I hope to understand better what they have experienced and endured.

Do I feel ashamed of this history? No, I don't. Am I proud of my father, who survived the bombardment of Tjilatjap on March 5, 1942 or of my mother who survived the camp-hospital Sint Vincentius in Batavia at the end of the war? No, pride is not the word. Their documents make me realize how easy, how spoiled my life has been. Rather, I feel thankful for the way they took up their lives when they united in the Netherlands in 1948.

But what about the Indonesian people who fought and survived the Dutch? How were they able to take up their lives in Kebumen? How did the grand parents of Ravie Ananda experience the Japanese and Dutch army during and after WW-II? I hope to understand something of their lives through Ravie Ananda's stories.

Timeline of events in the Dutch Indies after WW-II

- 1945. August 15th: Japanese capitulation (V.J.-day), - October battle of Soerabaya. Start of the so-called Bersiap-period (the battle-cry bersiap means "be prepared"). It was a period of Indonesian revolutionary violence that could develop during the retreat of the Japanese occupational army. It lasted until the British and later the Dutch military forces had been build up at the end of 1946.

-  1945. October 5th: establishment of the TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat), later called TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia ) and in 1947 called TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army consisting of 195.000 men).

- 1946. March: Dutch troops are allowed to enter Indonesia to take over British positions

- 1946. November 15th: Agreement of Lingadjati (Linggajati).

- 1947, 21 July. The Dutch launch "Operatie Product" ("Eerste politionele actie"; general Spoor; 95.000 men), breaking the Lingadjati Agreement by entering Republican-held territories and outraging world opinion. The Republican army, TNI (Tentara Nasinal Indonesia) could not offer much resistance. The "Police Action" lasted until August 5th, 1947. A newly organized bataljon called Andjing Nica, belonging to the Vth Brigade, moved under heavy fighting from Bandoeng to Gombong, west of Kebumen. Another section of the Vth Brigade was the 3-6 Regiment Field Artillery stationed in Gombong. The section was deployed in extensive cleansing operations as the one on October 19, 1947 near Karanganjar in Republican territory. On page 51 and 137 of his book about the Andjing Nica (see ref. 2), Sjoerd Lapré describes the action against Karanganjar. He describes fierce fightings and the capture of large stocks of mines and bombs, but does not mention the involvement of artillery.

- 1947. October 19th: "Cannonade of Candi".

- 1948. January 17th: Renville-agreement about demarcation lines, also so-called "van Mook-grenzen".

- 1948. December 19th until January 5th, 1949: "Operatie Kraai", second war or "Tweede Politionele Actie".

- 1949. January 28, Resolution of the United Nations condemning the Netherlands for its strategy in the colony and proposing the formation of a federal government in which the Republic would participate. August, Cease-fire.

- 1949. December 27th: transfer of sovereignty in Amsterdam.

Maps of central Java. The middle insert is from the book of Lapré (ref. 2, page 49).

Karanganyar and Kebumen locate to the east of the demarcation line at Kemit.

Lower panel: the distance between the alun-alun of Karanganyar and the Monument 

of the Candi-cannonade is about 1 km.

Commemorating the Cannonade of Candi on Sunday October 19th, 1947

The story written by Ravie Ananda on his website "Pancasila" was freely translated from Javanese with the help of Julia Tampubolon and using Google translate:

"Candi (signifies temple) is the name of a village located east of the alun-alun (central square) of Karanganyar in the District of Kebumen in Central Java.

After the First Dutch Military aggression (in dutch: Eerste Politionele Actie), in which they carried out an attack on the markets of Gombong and then Karanganyar (located on the highway Gombong - Kebumen), the markets were closed and moved to Candi as a general security measure, to avoid Dutch acts of violence. The Dutch knew about the existence of COP (“Corp Pertahanan” = Defense Corp) located in the Perlawanan street east of the alun-alun. At the market of Candi there was a COP-office and a warehouse, which at the time was led by Lt. Moeryoeni; there was also a “General Galley Kitchen” (kombuis), which was established voluntarily by citizens and opened to fighters.

The COP logistic’s office was hit by a Dutch cannon 3 times. The Dutch often fired their cannons to areas that are considered to be highly suspected. The intent of the cannonade was to screw up the concentration of TNI (Republican Army) defense forces. The Dutch previously conducted aerial reconnaissance with a dragonfly plane (a Piper Cub?) on October 19th 1947,  Sunday at 06.00 a.m. in cloudy weather. The Dutch first shot towards the south Sugihwaras village. The dragonfly plane was later seen above Candi giving ray code as well as dropping a few bombs as a guide towards the target for cannonades at two locations: Kenteng and Ragadana.

The Candi market was on two locations: east and west of the small river. The market is very simple but crowded by people carrying out sales and purchases. At 08.00 a.m. the market crowd was surprised by the arrival of the dragonfly plane, followed by the first canon shot that hit near the market. The plane was also guided by a Ducht spy who was in Legok (sub-village of Candi) by reflecting a mirror to the top as the location code. The spy was eventually killed as he was also exposed to the cannonade. His body was washed away in the river that was flooded by residents. The shellfire from Gombong was intensive like a hail of bullets.

Arround 10.00 a.m. the shooting stopped. Residents in the surrounding of Candi rushed to be evacuated. But it was not long before the cannonade started again, convulsing in the Candi village which includes the sub-villages: Pasar Candi, Cengkoreh, Sigedong, Serang, Kandangan, Legok, Gemiwang, Kepel, Plarangan and Pucung. The cannonade stopped arround 01.00 p.m. The number of grenades fired about 600. That can be calculated from the number of holes in the ground. After stop, citizens sheltering in Sigedong cave or in their homes fled to safe areas in Somawangsa, Karanggayam, Pandansari, Sruweng etc. Injured walked towards Kebumen for help in hospital.

Severe casualties at the Kebumen hospital were taken to hospital in Yogyakarta by train. The cannonade killed many local residents (covering 10 sub-villages of Candi) and other villagers that were on the market as well as refugees who were scattered around Candi. There are also members of the TNI, TP (Tentara Pelajar/ Students’ Army) and fighters.

Dead bodies were everywhere, especially in Candi market to the east of the railroad track. Many bodies occurred with head, hands and feet separated. There is also a body part caught in trees. The number of victims could be recorded as many as 786 people (13 members of TP). It’s very likely that bodies were washed away when the river was flooding.

Coffins were prepared by the DKT (Djawatan Kesehatan Tentara/ Health Army troops Departement) and RST (Rumah Sakit Tentara/ Hospital Army Troops) in Kebumen. The bodies of huge numbers of victims were buried in the yard – the holes were not deep enough to reduce odors, so the next day many graves were found that had been reopened by animals such as dogs and so on. Many parts of the bodies could not be buried separately because they had been devoured by animals. If bodies could be clearly identified as member of TP, they were collected and treated by his unit and transported to Kebumen. Subsequently transported to Purworejo or Yogyakarta by train according unity.

In addition there are also casualties in damaged or destroyed homes and a number of pets died like cows, buffaloes and goats. After the events of the cannonade Dutch troops often entered the Candi area and confiscated a variety of foodstuffs and livestock of residents, because the existence of a common kitchen in Candi as a fighter logistics persists.

After the state returned safely in 1949 survivors maimed for life were given compensation by the District of Rp15 (At that time the price worth of a little goat). The houses that were destroyed by the cannonade were rebuilt by the people without any help from the government. Until 2013 only some of the victims are still to be found; among others: Ahmad Sofyan (98 years old), Ahmad Suwito (88 years old) and Baniyah (80 years old).

Most of the victims with disabilities and child victims of the cannonade had died due to aging. To commemorate the event of the cannonade of Candi a simple memorial was made ​​of rocks in the middle of the market by citizens, then restored by TP. The first monument was moved in front of the Village Hall Candi.

Greetings Pancasila..!!

Source:

·  Interviews with the fighters cannonade Candi

·  Interviews with survivors: Ahmad Sofyan (98 years old), Ahmad Suwito (88 years old) and Baniyah (80 years old)."

  Ravie Ananda standing with his son at the first monument commemorating the cannonade 

of Candi. Right, the restored monument at the market place of Candi. 

Below: On three sides the inscription says (i) Warning Dutch cannonade during war 

of independence. (ii) To the victims of the cannonade. 786 deaths; 600 shots. 

(iii) Not fallen in vain. People have given ...?

Information about the cannonade as retrieved from the Dutch National Archive

Dr. Bart Luttikhuis of the KITLV (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) kindly helped me to find the Dutch sources that contain information about what happened on October 19th, 1947 in Karanganjar (Candi). In the National Archive in the Hague they gave me the original documents of the inventory numbers as noted by Bart Luttikhuis.

Below follows a summary of what I found in some of these documents (Archive #2.13.132, inventory numbers 1298, 2276, 2277, 3064, 3071, 3078 and 3225):

(1) From September 13th onwards many Republican infiltrations, directed from Karanganjar,       occurred in the region of Tjandjoer, where bombs and mines were placed by "civilians".

(2) As a result, the Dutch decided to clean the region between Gombong and Karanganjar, that lies beyond the Van-Mook-line. According to a Memo of 29 October 1947 by Lt.Kol. Six (see figure below; in Dutch), this line runs between Gombong and Karanganjar (at Kemit).

(3) The military action of the 3-6 Regiment Field Artillery about the action of October 19th (document 2277), is very scanty. It only mentions that the action started at 5:00 o'clock. A total of 1304 brisant grenades were fired, mainly on 2 kampongs that were not named. Many bomb loads (141) were unusable because of humidity and 50 grenades refused. It is further mentioned that the first shells hit own troops because of defects in the aiming devices.

(4) Military action of the Vth Bataljon KNIL Infantry by Lieutenant Colonel A. van Santen (Commanders Lapré and Trieling). From their chronological account:

6:00 Troops march from kampong Kaleng to kampong Kebongan.

6:30  Appearance of Pipercub.

6:35  Artillery firing on Kaligowog and kampong Madja.

6:50  Artillery firing on kampong Pagoetan.

7:12  Artiller firing stopped because grenades hit own troops.

9:45  Artillery fires on Karanganjar.

10:12 Firing stops.

11:45 Infantry advances to Karanganjar.

11:57 Houses in Karanganjar are searched. Many weapons and hundreds of grenades are found. Twenty three people taken prisoner.

13:00 Artillery is pulled back.

14:25 Heavy fighting near kampong Doewoer.

15:00 Infantry is retreating.

In total were 56 people taken prisoner. The enemy left 94 people dead on the battle field; not included deaths caused by artillery fire. No losses on Dutch side.

(5)  Note on Memo of Lt.Kl. Six (see image) written in pencil: "Is it true that during the cleansing operation of Karanganjar 500 people have been killed as reported by Djocja (radio)?" Answer on November 3rd: 124 dead people have been counted.

One of the documents (a Memo by Lt.Kl Six) reporting about the Karanganjar battle on October 19th, 1947. For handwritten pencil remark about the number of deaths, see text.

Remarks on the cannonade

The Dutch battle reports give a very factual and stand-offisch narrative of what happened in Karanganjar on the 19th of October 1947. By and large they agree with the story of Ravie Ananda reflecting the Indonesian experience (see above) and also with the account of Lapré in his book about the Vth Andjing Nica Bataljon of the KNIL operating in Central Java (see ref. 2).

In his book "The burning villages of General Spoor", Rémy Limpach (ref. 3) makes the following remark on page 395 (see also photograph #48 after page 466):

"Compared with tanks, planes and naval ships, it was the artillery, with its prolonged fire, that caused the greatest number of casualties, injuries and property damage. This was primarily because there was a lot of artillery capacity and the number of tanks and fighter planes remained very limited throughout the conflict. Moreover, Major General Simon de Waal (KNIL) estimated that based on his experiences, the shelling of the civilian population was generally more fatal and demanded more fatalities than air shelling. When in November 1947 he faced the question whether he would "punish" the enemy for laying a deadly roadside bomb with artillery or air shelling, he opted for an air strike that was more precize in his eyes and would make fewer civilian casualties."

From the Dutch reports it remains unclear how many civilians were killed; they only counted fighters from Republican army groups. The infantry entering Karanganjar must have seen the result of the shelling on the civilian population as reported in the above story of Ravie Ananda taken from his website "Wahyu Pancasila". Considering the large number of brisant grenades fired (1304), a death toll of 786 seems realistic.

Remarks on the books of L. de Jong and Rémy Limpach

In the study of dr. L. de Jong, entitled "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog", written down in 14 volumes, the chapters about the colonial war 1945-1950 appeared in the second part of volume 12. A first concept of the description of possible dutch war crimes or "derailing violence", was retracted by de Jong, because of protests from army veterans. He left the description to Lt-Gen. F. van der Veen in an annex to volume 12-2 (edition 1988). In an interview with the dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad (30 October 1984), de Jong confessed that if in that period (1945-1950) an organization like Amnesty International would have existed, the Netherlands would have been heavily critisized in every report.

For the first time Rémy Limpach's book gives us a scientific and extensive overview of the "faits accomplis" of dutch misbehaviors and war crimes. What would have happened if this study had appeared in 1969, the year that J. Hueting told his story? Would it have been able to break the protests of veteran groups, of the dutch public opninion? Or would it have been put aside as communist propaganda, a popular cliché at that time.

After previous studies by Van Doorn and Hendrix (1970), by civil servants (Excessennota, 1970) and by Oostindie (2015), Rémy Limpach's book effectuated a final push for our government to start an independent follow-up study of the decolonization in the Dutch-Indies; the decision was taken on 3 December 2016.

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Acknowledgments

I want to thank Julia Tampubolon (Jakarta) for helping me with translations of Ravie Ananda's web site, Dr. Bart Luttikhuis (KITLV) for giving me the document numbers of the National Archive, Prof. Petra Groen (NIMH) for helping me with abbreviations of faded ammunition of the KNIL-Infantry, Roelof Wartena for showing me around in the Netherlands Military Museum, Drs. M. Willemsen (NMM) for information about the cannons used by the KNIL and Rémy Limpach (NIMH) for discussions, advise and corrections of my story.

Literature

(1) Ben Bouman, "Succes in een verloren oorlog - het 6e Regiment Veldartillerie en zijn Speciale Troepen in de onafhankelijkheidsstrijd van de Republiek Indonesië, 1946-1949."

(2) Lapré,S.A. "Het Andjing Nica Bataljon (KNIL) in Nederlands-Indië (1945-1950)" (Ermelo, 1988).

(3) Limpach, Rémy P., "De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor". (Boom, Amsterdam, 2016) (www.boomgeschiedenis.nl).

(De)colonization

Walking through the exhibition "Colonial war, 1945-1949" (Dutch Resistance Museum, Amsterdam; 26th of November, 2015 / 3rd of April, 2016), two thoughts kept coming to my mind: Firstly, the notion how lucky I was never to have been in the position of those Dutch soldiers that had to shoot Indonesian villagers, mostly young men fighting for independence. Secondly, an awareness of what the photographs and interviews of the exhibition did nót show: that the cruelties of this war were related to and tolerated by the widespread feeling of superiority among the Dutch.

An ingrained colonial attitude of ~300 years of disrespectfulness towards the "inlanders", the native Indonesian people, had created a condition in which the atrocities could be admitted. Some 150,000 Dutch soldiers and officers, who had just experienced the German occupation in the Netherlands, had no clue about colonial relationships and only knew that the country was "our colony" (in dutch: "ons Indië") and that the Indonesian people were inferior.

 

The exhibition showed the cruelties of the colonial war, but not that what induced it: the feeling of superiority and the disrepectfulness by the Dutch colonists towards the Indonesian people.

We will probably read more about how this colonial attitude with its lack of respect has induced the reciprocal cruelties from Rémy Limpach, whose thesis will appear later this year. And probably also from the study about Indonesia of David van Reybrouck (the Belgian writer of "Congo"), which he announced (in dutch) when opening the Academic Year 2015-2016 at the Radboud University (Nijmegen).

And perhaps, on a more personal basis, from the letters (in french) of my mother as published in the Blog Postume. The letters reflect the self-evidence with which a Dutchman and Swiss woman install themselves as newlyweds in the colonies, in the village Kebumen on Java.

 

9th Edition (1891) of the Max Havelaar by Eduard Douwes Dekker. The book was given to me by my grandfather, who urged me to read it.

A reminder of colonial history.

1860. Publication of the "Max Havelaar". According to Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) it was "the book that killed colonialism", because of its accusation of expoiting the Javanese people.

Sukarno cited the book as an inspiration in his plea for independence. After all, one of his teachers was Ernest Douwes Dekker, whose great-uncle was Multatuli, the author of this famous book "Max Havelaar".

1900. The Dutch think to have the whole colony of Dutch East-Indies or "Insulinde" under their governmental control.

1927, 4th July. Sukarno (1901-1970) establishes the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). After being arrested in 1929 and released in 1931, Sukarno had become a popular hero known throughout Indonesia.

1933. To repress Indonesian nationalism, governor-general B.C. de Jonge bans Sukarno to the island Flores. Others (Mohammad Hatta en Soetan Sjahrir) would follow. The colony changes into a police state.

1933 is also the year in which my parents arrived in Kebumen.

1942, March. Japanese occupation of the Dutch East-Indies.

1945, August 15. Japanese capitulation after the Nagasaki atomic bombing.

1945, August 17. Sukarno proclaims Indonesian Independence, which started a diplomatic and armed resistence to the Netherlands. Sukarno formulated his ideological thinking in 5 principles known as "Pancasila".

How come that I had never learned about this philosophical formulation of the Indonesian state? It was the young Ravie Ananda from Kebumen who enlightened me just last year!

1946, November. British soldiers have been withdrawn from Indonesia and replaced by some 150,000 Dutch soldiers.

1947, 21 July. The Dutch launch "Operatie Product" (Eerste politionele actie), breaking the Linggadjati Agreement by entering Republican-held territories and outraging world opinion. The Republican army, TNI (Tantara Nasinal Indonesia) could not offer much resistance.

1948, 19 December. Following the defeat of a communist rebellion, the Dutch launch "Operatie Kraai" (Tweede politionele actie) causing again international outrage. The temporary capital of the Republic, Yogyakarta, was captured.

1949, 27 December. Complete transfer of sovereignty by Queen Juliana to Indonesia in The Hague. Sukarno flies from Yogyakarta to Jakarta, where he held a triumphant speech at the governor-general's palace.

Overseeing now all these complicated facts, what political awareness had penetrated to a Dutch individual like my father at the time? After surviving the POW camp and being repatriated in December 1945, he went back to Indonesia "to help restoring the colony" in 1946. He stayed for two years; it became a disaster.

The feelings of superiority of the colonial Dutch towards the Indonesian people led "our colony" to a catastrophe. Can we learn something from that? Did we learn something from reading Multatuli's "Max Haverlaar" of 1860?

Presently, we are struggling with feelings of superiority towards our islamitic fellow citizens. We do not accept them causing some of their young boys to go to IS. People are becoming afraid that they will disrupt our society. Yes, if we do not accept them the way they are, "l'histoire va se répéter".